Falcon v. Memorial Hospital: A Rational Approach to Loss-of-Chance Tort Actions by Willging, Kevin Joseph
Journal of Contemporary Health Law & Policy (1985-2015) 
Volume 9 Issue 1 Article 28 
1993 
Falcon v. Memorial Hospital: A Rational Approach to Loss-of-
Chance Tort Actions 
Kevin Joseph Willging 
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.edu/jchlp 
Recommended Citation 
Kevin J. Willging, Falcon v. Memorial Hospital: A Rational Approach to Loss-of-Chance Tort Actions, 9 J. 
Contemp. Health L. & Pol'y 545 (1993). 
Available at: https://scholarship.law.edu/jchlp/vol9/iss1/28 
This Note is brought to you for free and open access by CUA Law Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for 
inclusion in Journal of Contemporary Health Law & Policy (1985-2015) by an authorized editor of CUA Law 
Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact edinger@law.edu. 
CASE NOTE
FALCON V. MEMORIAL HOSPITAL: A RATIONAL
APPROACH TO LOSS-OF-CHANCE TORT
ACTIONS
I. INTRODUCTION
"Loss-of-Chance" tort actions are suits by or for a party who suffered
from a preexisting condition that lowered her survival chances to a point
below fifty percent and who has suffered a subsequent injury as the result of
negligent medical treatment. If that patient dies, the court must determine
who or what caused the injury. Did the preexisting condition run its course,
or did the negligence of the attending physician cause the patient's death?
Consider the following hypothetical:' Mr. Doe went to a physician with a
preexisting cancerous tumor, giving him a forty-five percent chance of sur-
vival. The physician negligently failed to diagnose the tumor, and Mr. Doe
went untreated for an additional six months. During that period of time, the
tumor grew and Mr. Doe's chance of survival diminished to merely ten per-
cent. Six months later, Mr. Doe died. In a wrongful death action by Mr.
Doe's widow, should the trial court grant the physician's motion for a di-
rected verdict? Under traditional tort law, a court would grant the motion
because the plaintiff could not prove by a preponderance of the evidence that
the physician caused the death of Mr. Doe. It is likely that Mr. Doe would
have died regardless of the negligent treatment because his original chance of
survival was only forty-five percent. Mrs. Doe would therefore be unable to
prove that but for the physician's negligence, Mr. Doe would be alive today.
The court, however, may find it difficult to ignore the fact that, with proper
treatment, the patient may have survived, and that the physician's negli-
gence may have, in fact, caused the patient's death.
In loss-of-chance cases, the court's inquiry focuses not on the question of
the physician's negligence but rather on the cause in fact of the patient's
death. The inquiry by the court focuses on the actual cause of death. Was it
the tumor, or the physician's negligence? If the statistics indicate a
probability that the patient would have died even with proper treatment, is
1. This situation is purely hypothetical and is not intended to mirror any actual
situations.
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there any way to avoid the harsh result of denying recovery to the survivor
of the negligently treated patient? Is there any way to justify imposing liabil-
ity on the medical profession? These questions have plagued courts in recent
medical malpractice cases in which the decedent had less than a fifty-percent
chance of survival before the physician's duty arose.2
This Note provides insight into the oft-misunderstood concept3 of loss-of-
chance and discusses the legal and policy arguments both for and against
acceptance of this tort action. In addition, this Note considers the recent
decision by the Michigan Supreme Court which addressed this precise prob-
lem in Falcon v. Memorial Hospital,4 comparing it to the approaches taken
by other courts that have faced this issue. After an examination of the vari-
ous policy arguments made by courts and commentators, this Note con-
cludes that courts should allow loss-of-chance tort actions in order to reach
a fair and consistent approach in a largely unsettled area of legal and medi-
cal practice.5
II. THE LOSS-OF-CHANCE DOCTRINE: HISTORY AND DEVELOPMENT
Under traditional tort law, a plaintiff must demonstrate that (1) the de-
fendant had a duty to the plaintiff; (2) the defendant breached that duty; (3)
the defendant was the cause-in-fact of the injury as well as the proximate
cause; and (4) the plaintiff suffered some injury.6 In loss-of-chance cases,
proving causation is the stumbling block in the analysis. The fact that the
patient had less than a fifty percent chance of survival from the start indi-
cates that she would have died even if she received proper medical treat-
ment. Therefore, the problem in these cases is reconciling the of loss-of-
chance doctrine with traditional tort principles of causation.
The loss-of-chance doctrine has its roots in a 1966 Fourth Circuit case. In
Hicks v. United States,7 the court of appeals analogized loss-of-chance ac-
2. Peter Hohenhaus, The Fourth Circuit Steps Back from the "Loss of Opportunity" Ap-
proach in Medical Malpractice in Hurley v. United States, 1991 WL 330760 (Mar. 1991).
3. Howard R. Feldman, Comment, Chances as Protected Interests: Recovery for the Loss
of Chance and Increased Risk, 17 U. BALT. L. REV. 139 (1987).
4. 462 N.W.2d 44 (Mich. 1990).
5. Hohenhaus, supra note 2, at 4. "The debate over the validity of the loss of opportu-
nity cause of action will continue into the future." Id.
6. See W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 30,
at 164-65 (5th ed. 1984).
7. 368 F.2d 626 (4th Cir. 1966). In Hicks, the wife of an enlisted man was brought to a
dispensary for treatment of abdominal pain. Id. at 628-29. The doctor on duty diagnosed the
patient as having gastroenteritis and prescribed pain relievers. Id. The woman died shortly
thereafter from high intestinal obstruction. Id. Expert testimony introduced at trial that
prompt diagnosis and surgery could have prevented the death of the patient. Id.
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tions to the legal theory of attempts to rescue.' Comparing a doctor's duty
to save his patient with a master's duty to save his seaman, the court held
that when a reasonable possibility of survival is destroyed by the doctor's
omission, the doctor will be held liable.9 The situation in Hicks was revisited
by the Fourth Circuit in Waffen v. United States.'° In Waffen, the court of
appeals recognized a cause of action and noted the difficulty in drawing a
distinct line for imposing liability at a fifty-percent chance of survival: This
distinction would require "pseudo-scientific precision and [would] encourage
a battle of experts between one who evaluates the lost chance at forty-nine
percent and the other who estimates it closer to fifty-one percent."" Ac-
cording to the Fourth Circuit, the plaintiff need only show that "the in-
creased risk amounted to a loss of a substantial possibility of survival."' 2
More recently, in Herskovits v. Group Health Cooperative, 3 the Washing-
ton Supreme Court held that the loss of a less-than-fifty percent chance of
survival constitutes a compensable injury under the Washington State
wrongful death statute.' 4 The plurality opinion, authored by Judge Pearson,
concluded that the injury was not the death itself, but rather the loss-of-
chance of survival.15 The "lead" 16 opinion by Justice Dore viewed the death
of the patient as the injury, but modified the required degree of proof of
causation. 17 Justice Dore's approach requires that the plaintiff merely pro-
vide medical evidence that the defendant increased the risk of harm to the
plaintiff,' 8 a far less stringent standard than the traditional standard of "but
8. Id. at 632-33.
9. Id. at 633.
10. 799 F.2d 911 (4th Cir. 1986). The rationale in Waffen was rejected by the same court
in Hurley v. United States, 923 F.2d 1091 (4th Cir. 1991), based on the court of appeals'
reliance on recent Maryland precedent rejecting loss-of-chance tort actions under Maryland
law. The court in Hurley did not criticize its previous holdings in Hicks and Waffen, but
merely recognized that Maryland decisions, specifically, Fennell Y. Southern Md. Hosp. Ctr.
Inc., 580 A.2d 206, 214-15 (Md. 1990), had rejected loss-of-chance claims. Hurley, 923 F.2d at
1098.
11. Waffen, 799 F.2d at 923.
12. Id.
13. 664 P.2d. 474 (Wash. 1983). Mrs. Herskovits died of a cancerous tumor that had
been detected two years earlier by Group Health. Id. at 476. A private physician testified for
the plaintiff that Group Health should have discovered the tumor six months before it did,
when the patient was seen for a chronic cough. Id. According to the physician, this failure to
properly diagnose the tumor decreased the patients chances of survival from 39% to 25%. Id.
14. Id. at 477.
15. Id. at 487.
16. Linda Roubik, Recovery for "Loss of Chance" in a Wrongful Death Action - Hersko-
vits v. Group Health, 59 WASH. L. REV. 981, 984 n.16 (1984).
17. Herskovits, 664 P.2d at 476-77.
18. Id. at 476-478.
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for" causation.' 9
These opinions and others that have followed, confuse the legal issues in-
volved in loss-of-chance malpractice cases.2° The issues faced by courts like
the Falcon court include: (1) Identification of the actual injury suffered, (2)
the applicable standard of proving causation, "but for" or a modified stan-
dard, and (3) the policy justifications that should be given the most weight.
III. FALCON V. MEMORIAL HOSPITAL
A. The Facts of Falcon
On March 22, 1973, Nena Falcon, then nine-months pregnant, was admit-
ted to Memorial Hospital under the care of Dr. Kelso." At Falcon's re-
quest, Dr. Kelso "administered a saddle block anaesthetic prior to delivery
of the child.",22 No intravenous line was inserted at any time during delivery
or after.23 Immediately after delivery of her child, Ms. Falcon fell into a
convulsive state.24 Attempts to resuscitate her were unsuccessful and she
subsequently died.25 An autopsy revealed that the cause of death was an
amnionic fluid embolism, which is both unpredictable and life-threatening.26
Nena Falcon's mother brought a wrongful death suit against Dr. Kelso
and the hospital, claiming that the physician's negligence, in failing to recog-
nize Nena's condition and to take preventive steps to reduce the chances of
death, brought about Nena's premature death.27 Deposition testimony was
offered that included a statement by Dr. Abouleish, the plaintiff's expert,
that although patients who are stricken with amniotic fluid embolisms have
only a 37.5% chance of survival, 2s Nena Falcon's chance for survival would
have been significantly higher had an intravenous line been inserted. 29 The
trial court granted the defendants' motion for a directed verdict based on its
finding that the experts who testified as to the appropriate standard of care
were not qualified to do so. 3' The Michigan Court of Appeals reversed is
finding as to the experts and remanded to the trial court directing it to allow
19. Roubik, supra note 16, at 984.
20. See Hohenhaus, supra note 2 at 6-10 (illustrating the constant reinterpretation of the
law in this area).






27. Id. at 49, 59 (Riley, C.J., dissenting).
28. Id. at 59.
29. Id.
30. Id.
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the expert testimony.31
On remand, the trial court granted the defendants' motion for summary
judgment, holding that the plaintiff failed to prove that the defendants' negli-
gence was the proximate cause of Ms. Falcon's death.32 The court of ap-
peals again reversed, and the defendants appealed this decision.3
B. The Rationale of Falcon and its Predecessors
In Falcon, the Michigan Supreme Court considered whether to recognize
Mrs. Falcon's cause of action on the basis of loss-of-chance. It was undis-
puted on appeal that Nena Falcon had only a 37.5% chance of survival due
to the embolism.3 4 It was also undisputed that Dr. Kelso was negligent in
not placing an intravenous line in Nena Falcon. 35 The issue before the court
was whether the plaintiff had any legal basis for her cause of action and, if
so, how damages should be determined. Traditional tort law mandated that
the plaintiff had no cause of action.3 6 In loss-of-chance cases, the patient has
a less-than-fifty percent chance of survival before treatment by the negligent
physician. 37 The plaintiff normally does not have a cause of action under
traditional tort law because she cannot prove that the doctor's negligence
caused the patient's death.38
Most states impose a standard of proof that requires the plaintiff to show
that the patient would have survived had it not been for the negligence of the
defendant; in other words the patient's chances for recovery must exceed
fifty percent.39 Several cases before Falcon, however, found a cause of action
without this better-than-fifty percent chance of recovery requirement.' The
Falcon court examined thosecases and determined that Michigan law would
31. Id. at 59-60.
32. Id. at 60.
33. Id.
34. Id. at 59. Dr. Abouleish testified that out of 100 patients suffering from this fluid
embolism, 50 will die within the first half hour after labor. Id. at 59. Of the 50 that survive the
first half hour, 25 will develop a blood coagulation problem and only 12 1/2 of those will
survive. Id.
35. Id.
36. Jack Rosati, Causation in Medical Malpractice: A Modified Valuation Approach, 50
OHIO ST. L. J. 469, 471 (1989).
37. Feldman, supra note 3, at 143.
38. Rosati, supra note 36, at 471.
39. Id. A majority of states have adopted one of two standards requiring the plaintiff to
show a better-than-fifty percent chance of recovery. Those standards are: (1) that the plaintiff
have a better than 50% chance of recovery to a "reasonable medical certainty," the most
stringent standard for plaintiffs, and (2) that the plaintiff have a greater than 50% chance of
recovery to a "reasonable probability," which is a less stringent standard. Id.
40. See, e.g., DeBurkarte v. Louvar, 393 N.W.2d 131 (Iowa 1986); Roberson v. Coun-
selman, 686 P.2d 149 (Kan. 1984); Aasheim v. Humberger, 695 P.2d 824 (Mont. 1985).
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recognize loss-of-chance as an actionable tort.4 1
The cases and commentaries on this subject properly demonstrate that
this legal construct comports with tort law and public policy. The remain-
der of this Note will examine the Michigan Supreme Court's views on the
issues of causation and valuation as compared to the views of other courts
and commentators.
1. Causation
As previously discussed, under traditional tort law, a plaintiff must estab-
lish five factors for a proper cause of action. They are: That the defendant
owed the plaintiff a duty; that the defendant breached that duty; that the
plaintiff was in some way injured; that the defendant's negligence caused the
injury; and that the negligence was the proximate cause of the injury.42
When a patient has a preexisting condition that leaves her with a less-
than-fifty percent chance of survival, causation is difficult to prove.43 If a
plaintiff is able to prove causation, she is able to recover the full amount of
the pecuniary loss.' A court, however, must reconcile traditional tort cau-
sation principles with the patient's preexisting condition. The issue is
whether the preexisting condition or the defendant's negligence caused the
patient's death.
According to the Falcon court, the compensable injury at issue was not
Nena Falcon's death but rather the loss of opportunity to live.45 This dis-
tinction is critical. The plaintiff could not prove that the defendants were
the but-for cause of her daughter's death, but had shown that the defendants
were the cause-in-fact of the loss of Nena's 37.5% chance of survival.46
Under this approach, the plaintiff need not show that the defendant was the
but-for cause of the death.47 Plaintiff need show only that the defendant
41. Falcon v. Memorial Hosp., 462 N.W.2d 44, 48, 52 (Mich. 1990).
42. Perez v. Las Vegas Medical Ctr., 805 P.2d 589 (Nev. 1991). See also KEETON ET AL.,
supra note 6, at 164-65.
43. Joseph H. King Jr., Causation, Valuation and Chance in Personal Injury Torts Involv-
ing Preexisting Conditions and Circumstances, 90 YALE L. J. 1353, 1356-57 (1981). Preexisting
conditions can be defined as "a disease, condition[,] or force that has become sufficiently asso-
ciated with the victim to be factored into the value of the interest destroyed, and that has
become so before the defendant's conduct has reached a similar stage." Id. at 1357. In other
words, a preexisting condition is one which the injured party has before treatment by a physi-
cian and one which is significantly related to the nature of the treatment performed by the
physician. Id.
44. Id. at 1356, 1363.
45. Falcon v. Memorial Hosp., 462 N.W.2d 44, 52 (Mich. 1990).
46. Id. at 45-46.
47. Id. at 52.
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caused the loss of that chance of survival.48 With traditional causation prin-
cipals intact, the plaintiff is able to maintain a legitimate case against the
negligent physician.4 9
Because the defendants cannot be said to have caused Nena Falcon's
death, they were not held responsible for her death, but rather for the loss of
her opportunity to survive.5° The injury resulting from the malpractice was
"not only . . . the physical harm, but also . . . the loss of opportunity of
avoiding physical harm."51 The court held that by denying Nena Falcon of
a thirty-seven-percent chance of survival, the defendants deprived her of a
"loss of opportunity" to live. 2 In so finding, the Michigan court found the
defendants liable for thirty-seven percent of the compensation otherwise
awarded under the wrongful death statute.53
In a seminal comment, professor Joseph King expounds the theory relied
upon by the Falcon court.54 Professor King criticizes the all-or-nothing ap-
proach of traditional tort law as being contrary to the purposes and goals of
tort law.55 King asserts that courts often fail to distinguish between the
cause of the injury and the value to which the injured party is entitled.56
According to King, courts should recognize a tort action which awards
damages for loss of a patient's opportunity to survive and to continue life.57
As King points out, courts should acknowledge injuries other than death:
[E]ven if the plaintiff is not entitled to recover for the loss of a
chance of completely avoiding some specific harm, such as cancer-
induced death, he might still be entitled to recover for the loss of a
chance to slow the course of the disease or to mitigate its painful
48. Id.
49. Justice Levin, author of the plurality opinion, focused on the breach of understanding
between patient and doctor. Id. at 52-53. The implied understanding between Nena Falcon
and Dr. Kelso was that he would undertake such procedures as would most effectively limit
the chance of injury to the patient. Id. By failing to insert the intravenous line, Dr. Kelso





54. See generally King, supra note 43, at 1363 (expounding the theory that loss-of-chance
comports with traditional tort principles). Professor King is considered an exceptional author-
ity in the area of medical malpractice and specifically loss-of-chance actions. He has been cited
extensively by many courts, including the Michigan Supreme Court in Falcon. Other courts
have also relied on King's theories. See, e.g., Hare v. Foster G. McGaw Hosp., 549 N.E.2d
778, 783 (Ill. 1989); Cooper v. Hartman, 533 A.2d 1294, 1296 (Md. 1987); Aasheim v.
Humberger, 695 P.2d 824, 828 (Mont. 1989); McKellips v. Saint Francis Hosp., 741 P.2d 467,
476 (Okla. 1987).
55. King, supra note 43, at 1377.
56. Id. at 1363.
57. Id. at 1372-73.
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effects."
In addition, King argues that the patient may lose a chance to benefit from
potential scientific breakthroughs.59 If, for example, medical technology has
the capacity to prolong a patient's life, but the health care provider fails to
utilize that technology, that health care provider should be liable for depriv-
ing the patient of her ability to enjoy any relevant medical advancements
that may have affected her situation.' King concludes that "[loss of chance
should be compensable even if the chance is not better than even, and it
should be recognized and valued as such rather than an all-or-nothing prop-
osition."'" Thus, King rejects the relaxation of generally accepted causation
principles and finds that the loss-of-chance is a separate and distinct injury.
Similarly, other jurisdictions have recognized loss-of-chance as an injury
unto itself. The Supreme Court of Nevada recognized loss-of-chance as an
actionable tort in Perez v. Las Vegas Medical Center.62 The court defined the
loss not as the death, but rather as the loss of the chance of survival caused
by medical malpractice. 63 By defining the injury as such, the "traditional
rule of preponderance is fully satisfied .... The medical malpractice more
probably than not decreased a substantial chance of survival and the injured
person ultimately died or was severely debilitated. '" It is important to rec-
ognize that the compensable injury recognized in Perez was not the death of
the patient, but the loss of the opportunity to live.
Those who argue that the injury at issue is the patient's death express
concern that courts focusing on loss-of-chance have to compensate a plaintiff
who "beat the odds" and survived despite the defendant's negligence. 65 In
that case, did the plaintiff actually suffer any injury because of the loss-of-
chance? Commentators who argue this point have misapplied the notion of
"loss-of-chance." Although the doctor is responsible for decreasing the pa-
tient's chance of survival, there is no compensable damage if the patient fully
recovers. 66 Therefore, if Nena Falcon survived despite her doctor's negli-
gence, she would have a cause of action that would bear no fruit in terms of
damages. While neither death nor actual injury is a compensable injury in
58. Id. at 1373.
59. Id.
60. Id. at 1376.
61. Id.
62. 805 P.2d 589 (Nev. 1991) (involving a physician who failed to diagnose an inmate's
brain hemorrhage). In Perez, one expert testified that plaintiff "probably did not have a greater
than fifty percent chance" of surviving the aneurism. Id. at 591.
63. Id. at 592.
64. Id. (emphasis in original).
65. Roubik, supra note 16, at 985.
66. Id.
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such a case, both are manifestations that such an injury occurred and prove
that damages ought to be awarded. The lack of death or injury does not
absolve the physician from liability; rather, their absence is factored into the
determination of damages. If the party does not die, the monetary award
will be a nullity. Therefore, the plaintiff has a cause of action in theory, but
one which yields no return.67
A great deal of the confusion surrounding loss-of-chance tort actions has
resulted from courts' attempts to counteract the harsh results of the all-or-
nothing approach by changing the standard of proof imposed upon the
plaintiff.68 Reformulation of the standard of proof is a fundamentally flawed
approach and should not be used by courts to rebel against the all-or-noth-
ing approach. This approach was examined by the Ohio Supreme Court in
Coopers v. Sisters of Charity,69 which rejected a claim that the standard of
proof should be lowered in loss-of-chance cases. The court held that the
plaintiff failed to show that the injury was caused by the defendant more
probably than not, and because this standard had not been met, plaintiff was
disallowed recovery on any basis.70
Some courts, however, have failed to properly identify the injury sustained
and have resorted to the practice of lowering the standard of proof required
to prevail in a loss-of-chance suit. In Scafidi v. Seiler, the New Jersey
Supreme Court found liability for a physician's failure to prescribe tocolytic
therapy.71 Instead of recognizing the loss of the premature child's chance of
survival, that court lowered the standard of proof from the "probability" to
the "substantial factor" test.72 As Professor King warned, however, the
standard of proof should be established by the court, regardless of the type
of tort action."' The only legal basis for allowing recovery is the recognition
of a distinct tort.74 As the Florida Supreme Court pointed out in Gooding v.
University Hospital Building, Inc. ,7 relaxation of the causation requirement
may "correct a perceived unfairness" to the party who could not prove tradi-
tional causation, but at the same time it may cause injustice to the defend-
ant-physician. Finding a separate action (e.g., loss-of-chance) is the only
way to allow recovery without subverting traditional tort principles. This
separate action recognizes the loss of opportunity to survive as distinct from
67. See discussion infra part III.B.2.
68. See, e.g., Scafidi v. Seiler, 574 A.2d 398 (N.J. 1990).
69. 272 N.E.2d 97, 104 (Ohio 1971).
70. Id.
71. 574 A.2d at 398. Tocolytic therapy is used to delay labor in pregnant women. Id.
72. Id. at 406.
73. See King, supra note 43, at 1366.
74. Id.
75. 445 So. 2d 1015, 1019-20 (Fla. 1984).
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the injury of death. The Michigan Supreme Court correctly identified the
injury involved.
2. Valuation of damages
Once a court recognizes that the patient's loss of the opportunity to sur-
vive is a cognizable cause of action, the court must then determine the ap-
propriate standard for the calculation of damages. In the all-or-nothing
approach of traditional tort law, the plaintiff, if able to prove that her
chances of recovery were greater than fifty percent, will receive one-hundred
percent of the determined value of damages caused by the death of the pa-
tient, even though the plaintiff did not prove to a one-hundred percent de-
gree of certainty that the defendant caused the loss.7 6 If the plaintiff is
unable to prove that the negligence more probably than not caused the
death, then the plaintiff is denied relief." Under the loss-of-chance ap-
proach, the plaintiff is awarded a measure of damages in proportion to the
amount of loss in the chance of survival caused by the defendant.78
In Falcon, the Michigan Supreme Court found a solution to the problem
of valuing Mrs. Falcon's loss: because the defendants in Falcon were respon-
sible for depriving Nena Falcon of only a percentage of her chance of sur-
vival, the court determined that their liability should reflect that
percentage.79 Therefore, because Nena Falcon had only a 37.5% chance of
survival due solely to her preexisting condition, the physicians were held
liable only for an identical percentage of the amount awarded under a
wrongful death action.8 0 This approach is rational and consistent because
the full amount of damages under a wrongful death action should not be
awarded when death is not the injury in question."' Because the injury is the
loss of chance, the physician should be liable only for the loss of that chance
for which he is responsible. This approach of setting a value for the plain-
tiff's loss is known as the "expected value" or "weighted mean"
computation.8
2
Under the expected value approach, the trier of fact considers all possible
outcomes and the value of each, discounted by the likelihood of occur-
76. Falcon v. Memorial Hosp., 462 N.W.2d 44, 47 (Mich. 1990).
77. King, supra note 43, at 1353.
78. That is to say that the physician should be held liable for a share proportionate to the
chance of survival which he diminished through his negligence, regardless of whether the pa-
tient had a one percent chance of survival or a ninety-nine percent chance.
79. Falcon, 462 N.W.2d at 57.
80. Id.
81. Id. at 52. The Michigan Supreme Court determined that the injury to Nena Falcon
was the loss of her chance to live, not her actual death. Id.
82. King, supra note 43, at 1384.
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rence.83 This method "more precisely measures the value of chance ...
[and] is more consonant with a central purpose of valuing chance: achieving
a more rational and accurate loss allocation."'" Although the extensive use
of statistics has drawn serious criticism, 5 King argues that their use is "es-
sential" and points out that statistics are already used in the causation pro-
cess. 6 This formulation of damages is the most accurate, most effective
means of valuation.8 7 In this way, the physician is held responsible for the
injury that he caused and is not held liable as if he were the only possible
cause. 
88
In fact, King takes this approach even further than a loss-of-chance dis-
cussion warrants. In maintaining that the physician should be responsible
only for the chance which he caused the patient to lose, King extends his
system of valuation to cases in which the plaintiff shows a better-than-fifty
percent chance of survival.89 Continuing to employ the all-or-nothing ap-
proach in these cases would be an anomaly. In one case, the physician
would be liable only for the portion of the loss for which he was the cause.
In another case, he would be held liable for the entire loss, the patient's
death, under the potentially mistaken assumption that he was solely respon-
sible. Such an approach would result in overcompensation for plaintiffs on
the whole.90 Therefore, in the interest of fairness and consistency, the plain-
tiff should receive the proportion of the damages for which the physician is
responsible, regardless of whether the probability of his negligence being the
cause was above or below fifty percent.
IV. POLICY CONSIDERATIONS IN THE USE OF LOSS-OF-CHANCE
ACTIONS
A. Arguments in Favor of the Use of Loss-of-Chance
The Falcon court recognizes that the physician-patient relationship is one
which is entered into "not only to prevent disease or death, but also to defer
or ameliorate the suffering associated with disease or death,"'" a viewpoint
83. Id.
84. Id.
85. Lawrence H. Tribe, Trial by Mathematics: Precision and Ritual in the Legal Process,
84 HARv. L. REV. 1329, 1330 & n.2 (1971).
86. King, supra note 43, at 1385. Statistics are necessary for the fact-finder, even in tradi-
tional tort actions in determining whether the plaintiff's chances for survival exceeded 50%.
Id.




91. Falcon v. Memorial Hosp., 462 N.W.2d 44, 51 (Mich. 1990).
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closely resembling contract law.9 2 The patient expects the physician to pro-
vide adequate services whether or not the patient has a greater-than-fifty-
percent chance of survival. If a physician breaches that duty, she should not
be able to avoid the consequences of her actions merely because the patient's
chance of survival was less than fifty percent.
The Supreme Court of Kansas, in Roberson v. Counselman,93 articulated
the problems associated with freeing physicians from liability. The court
asserted that:
The reasoning of the district court herein [which rejected loss-of-
chance as a cognizable tort] in essence, declares open season on
critically ill or injured persons as care providers would be free of
liability for even the grossest malpractice if the patient had only a
fifty-fifty chance of surviving the disease or injury even with proper
treatment.
94
This rationale was explicitly adopted by the court in Falcon.95
Professor King has also provided policy reasons for recognizing the loss-
of-chance as a separate tort. "The all-or-nothing approach distorts the loss-
assigning role of [tort] law[,] ... undermines the whole range of functions
served by the causation-valuation process[,] and strikes at the integrity of the
torts system of loss allocation."96 The tort system of law imposes liability
for negligent actions that cause harm. To deny compensation to patients
merely because they may have incurred the injury anyway, subverts the tort
system of law by allowing physicians to hide behind the fifty percent
threshold.97
Consider another hypothetical. One hundred women suffer from the same
condition from which Nena Falcon suffered and are treated with similar neg-
ligence. Under the all-or-nothing approach, none of the subsequent suits
will result in compensation for the survivors of the decedent women, despite
92. Id. The court advances the notion that doctors and hospitals are not utilized merely
to deal with the physical problems of the patients. Id. Doctors are engaged by the patient to
perform services for the patient. Id. The relationship resembles contract law in the sense that
these physicians are compensated for the services that they perform, and as such their services
must include the treatment of illness or sickness regardless of the chances of the patient for
survival. Id. But see James J. Murphy, Beyond Autonomy: Judicial Restraint and the Legal
Limits Necessary to Uphold the Hippocratic Tradition and Preserve the Ethical Integrity of the
Medical Profession, 9 J. Contemp. Health L. & Pol'y 1301, 1332-34 (1993) (arguing that a
physician is not bound to provide treatment that is futile, non-beneficial or otherwise medically
inappropriate).
93. 686 P.2d 149 (Kan. 1984).
94. Roberson v. Counselman, 686 P.2d 149 (Kan. 1984).
95. Falcon, 462 N.W.2d at 51.
96. King, supra note 43, at 1377.
97. Id.
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the fact that approximately thirty-seven would still be alive had their treat-
ment been proper.98 Under the approach taken by the Michigan Supreme
Court in Falcon, and advocated by Professor King, however, the subsequent
actions would yield a return of thirty-seven percent of the aggregate dam-
ages. This is an equitable approach when one considers that proper treat-
ment would have kept approximately thirty-seven women alive. Instead of
rewarding only those patients who demonstrate a better-than-fifty percent
chance of survival with the entire pecuniary amount under the wrongful
death statute, the expected value system allows recovery by all parties, but
only to the extent that the physician was responsible for the loss.99 There-
fore, if one half of a hospital's patients have a fifty-one percent chance of
survival, and the other half have a survival chance of forty-nine percent, and
all die as a result of medical negligence, the system set forth in Falcon would
reapportion the awards among all the patients."
California has taken a different approach.'01 In Dumas v. Cooney, the
California Court of Appeals found the above hypothetical to be inequitable
because sixty-three plaintiffs would be compensated even though the odds
show that they would have died with proper treatment. 10 2 That court ig-
nored two important considerations. First, if the doctors, in these situations
had not been negligent, there would still be questions as to which of the one
hundred women would be alive.'0 3 Second, the cost to these physicians is no
greater than if they were required to pay the entire pecuniary amount in
damages to the thirty-seven women whose death they actually caused. As
Professor King points out, this is the "most administratable and consistent
98. Falcon v. Memorial Hosp. 462 N.W.2d 44, 59 (Mich. 1990) (Riley, C.J., dissenting).
If one hundred parties bring suit, with each patient individually having a 25% chance of sur-
vival, then each suit will fail because none of the plaintiffs could show that the defendant was
the but for cause of the injury. Id.
According to the testimony of Dr. Abouleish in the Falcon case, of 100 women suffering
from the embolism, 50 will die immediately, 25 will survive, and the remaining 25 will develop
a blood coagulation and one-half of those 25, or 12 1/2 will die from the coagulation. There-
fore, of the original 100, 37 1/2 will survive. Id.
99. Dumas v. Cooney, Cal. App. 3d (Cal. Ct. App. (1991). The California Court of Ap-
peals in Dumas argued that this method resulted in overcompensation to the parties that
would have died anyway. Id. While recognizing that this may be the case, it is important to
keep in mind that the uncertainty concerning who the survivors would be was, in essence
created by the negligence of the physician. The expected value approach considers that some
compensation to all patients is more just since the lack of certainty was caused by the
physician.
100. By recognizing a loss-of-chance action for each of the survivors and assessing damages
under the expected value approach, each plaintiff receives 37% of the amount otherwise recov-
erable under the wrongful death statute.
101. See, Dumas v. Cooney, 235 Cal. App. 3d at 1608.
102. Id. at 1609.
103. King, supra note 43, at 1378.
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method for dealing with many complicated cases."' '
Instead of struggling with the question of causation in the traditional
sense, and then determining whether some other means of counteracting an
otherwise harsh result are available, a court may simply apply the loss-of-
chance doctrine to determine the percentage of the loss for which the physi-
cian is negligent and award damages equal to that percentage. As a result, a
court need not lower the standard of proof,'° 5 nor subvert tort principles. '
0 6
The Oklahoma Supreme Court expounded this principal in McKellips v.
Saint Francis Hospital, Inc.'°7 In allowing the claim by the deceased's
widow for the hospital's failure to diagnose a heart attack properly, the
Oklahoma Supreme Court held that the defendants "should not benefit from
the uncertainty created by their own negligence."' 0 Professor King re-
sounds this notion: "But for the defendant's tortious conduct, it would not
have been necessary to grapple with the imponderables of chance. Fate
would have run its course."'" The physician should not be able to walk
away from a situation that he potentially created, merely because the patient
may have died in any case.
Another important policy consideration is that the recognition of loss-of-
chance actions would deter physicians from minimizing the importance of
properly treating terminally ill or critically injured patients." 0 Physicians
will no longer be able to dodge liability for their negligent acts merely be-
cause their patient had a less-than-fifty percent chance of survival. In addi-
tion, doctors and health care specialists will utilize the most effective
methods available in an effort to save their patients."'
B. Arguments against the use of Loss-of-Chance
Many courts faced with the adoption of loss-of-chance rejected it." 2
Likewise, Chief Justice Riley vigorously opposed the position of the plurality
in Falcon."3 While this view is not without merit, the legal and policy justi-
fications fall clearly on the side of the acceptance of loss-of-chance actions.
104. Id.
105. Gooding v. University Hosp. Bldg., Inc., 445 So. 2d 1015, 1019 (Fla. 1984).
106. Hare v. Foster G. McGaw Hosp., 549 N.E.2d 778, 783-84 (Ill. App. Ct. 1989) (refus-
ing to impose liability on hospital for failure to properly diagnose patient's fatal hepatitis).
107. 741 P.2d 467, 474 (Okla. 1987).
108. Id.
109. King, supra note 43, at 1378.
110. Herskovits v. Group Health Coop., 664 P.2d 474, 477 (Wash. 1983
111. See, e.g., Cooper v. Sisters of Charity, 272 N.E.2d 97 (Ohio 1971).
112. See, e.g., Gooding v. University Hosp. Bldg., Inc., 445 So. 2d 1015, 1019 (Fla. 1984);
Hare v. Foster G. McGaw Hosp., 549 N.E.2d 778 (Ill. App. Ct. 1989).
113. Falcon v. Memorial Hosp., 462 N.W.2d 44, 58 (Mich. 1990) (Riley, C.J., dissenting).
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Arguing against loss-of-chance, Chief Justice Riley ultimately fails to accu-
rately discern exactly what this tort involves.114 The Chief Justice contends
that "[t]he recognition of a lost chance as a cognizable injury is necessarily
based on the reasoning that but for the defendant's negligence, the plaintiff
might possibly have avoided an adverse result. Thus, recognition of lost
chance as a recoverable interest contradicts the very notion of cause in
fact.'"" In misconstruing the standard of proof to be one of possibility, the
Chief Justice misunderstands the concept of loss-of-chance. Loss-of-Chance
does not mandate a relaxation of traditional tort standards of causation.
116
The action is based on the injury being the lost opportunity, not the death
itself." 7 To state that this cause of action allows for recovery when the
physician "might possibly" have caused the injury,' is to misunderstand
the concept. The plaintiff must prove that the physician's negligence caused
the loss-of-chance of survival, using whatever standard that state applies in
torts cases, typically a preponderance of the evidence." 9
Despite Chief Justice Riley's suggestion, loss-of-chance does not "abandon
the truth seeking function of law." 2 ' Instead, this distinct tort action recog-
nizes that the truth in a wrongful death action cannot always be ascertained.
In the interest of fairness to the plaintiff, loss-of-chance seeks to determine
whether or not the defendant caused the loss of the plaintiff's chance of
survival. Accordingly, Mrs. Falcon was awarded damages from the defend-
ants because they deprived her daughter of a thirty-seven percent chance of
survival, not because they caused her daughter's death.' 2 '
The Chief Justice also contends that deterrence will not result from the
recognition of loss-of-chance damages. This viewpoint suggests that either
doctors frequently act negligently, or that they need not act with due care
for people who have a lower-than-fifty percent chance of survival. The effect
of assuming the Chief Justice's view would be to "declared open season on
critically ill or injured persons."'
122
Chief Justice Riley's suggestion that loss-of-chance will increase health
care costs is tenuous at best. In fact, incidents of medical malpractice would
arguably decrease because physicians would act more carefully; would en-
sure that tests are conducted properly; and would consider all methods of
114. Id.
115. Id. at 65 (emphasis in original).
116. King, supra note 43 at 1376.
117, Falcon v. Memorial Hosp., 462 N.W.2d 44, 52 (Mich. 1990).
118. Id. at 65 (Riley, C.J., dissenting).
119. King, supra note 43, at 1367.
120. Falcon, 462 N.W.2d at 66 (Mich. 1990) (Riley, C.J., dissenting).
121. Id. at 57.
122. Roberson v. Counselman, 686 P.2d 149, 160 (Kan. 1984).
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treatment available. 23 In addition, it is worth noting once again that the
aggregate amount of damages under the loss-of-chance approach would not
increase. Furthermore, if the number of loss-of-chance cases is fewer than
the number of traditional medical malpractice cases, the cost to the physi-
cians would be lower.124 Therefore from an economic point of view, it may
be more cost effective to adopt loss-of-chance tort actions.
The Court of Appeals of Maryland rejected the loss-of-chance theory be-
cause, among other things, the use of statistics and probabilities would con-
fuse the jury.125 According to that court, such evidence is "unreliable,
misleading and easily manipulated .... ,26 The Maryland court expresses
fear that the excessive use of statistics offered by both sides will lead to an
unworkable system for medical malpractice cases.' 2 7 The loss-of-chance
case, however, utilizes statistics no more than a traditional wrongful death
action. In both cases, the patient's preexisting condition must be considered.
As the Maryland Court acknowledges, traditional cases involve a determina-
tion that a patient had a 50.1% chance of survival. To impose liability, the
trier of fact must consider statistical evidence of the patient's chance of sur-
vival; the negligence of the physician, assuming liability; and the amount of
damages to be awarded. 2 ' Even in traditional all-or-nothing cases, statisti-
123. Feldman, supra note 3, at 151.
124. As an example, assume that 100 cases come to Hospital X, and that the value of the
pecuniary interest of each of these patients is $100,000. Under the modified valuation ap-
proach, if 50 cases are brought under the loss-of-dhance doctrine with each patient having a
25% chance of survival, the loss of these lives through negligence will impose a liability of
$1,250,000.00 ($25,000 x 50). If the other 50 patients have a 75% chance of survival, the loss
of their lives would impose liability of $3,750,000. Thus, in a jurisdiction that recognizes loss-
of-chance damages, Hospital X would face a total liability of $5 million when the number of
cases are the same on either side of 50% threshold. If the number of loss-of-chance patients is
5 and the other class remains at 50, the death of the loss-of-chance patients would result in
$125,000.00. The class of patients with a 75% chance of survival would still result in
$3,750,000. ($75,000 x 50). Thus the total liability would be $3,875,000.
If the jurisdiction does not recognize loss of chance, then the liability in the first case above
(when the cases are both 50 persons in each class) would break down as follows: No liability
for the loss of chance patients, and full liability for the others; thus $5,000,000 would be the
total liability. The second example, however, brings about a different result. If there are 5
loss-of-chance patients and 50 patients with a 75% chance of survival, the outcome is still
$5,000,000. As a result, the outcome in a jurisdiction which has adopted loss of chance is
$1.125 million lower than the jurisdiction that does not recognize loss-of-chance.
125. See Fennell v. Southern Md. Hosp. Ctr. Inc., 580 A.2d 206, 213 (Md. 1990) (refusing
to recognize a tort action where the emergency room doctors failed to provide needed treat-
ment, and the patient subsequently died from swelling of the brain, a symptom of bacterial
meningitis).
126. Id. at 213.
127. Id. at 214.
128. In traditional tort liability cases, the trier of fact must determine that the decedent had
a greater-than-50% chance of survival. To do so requires that the trier engage in statistical
Loss of Chance Torts
cal evidence is necessary. Therefore, the unequivocal argument that loss-of-
chance cases will involve "bewildering sets of numbers," 2 9 is an attack on
all wrongful death actions.
Another commentator argued that physicians should not be "frustrated
by the law's conversion of survival statistics gathered over decades and in-
volving thousands of patients into a yardstick used to measure one specific
life." '° The response to this line of argument is simple: Why allow the
physician to benefit from the very same statistics when they show the pa-
tient's chances of survival to be less than fifty percent? If statistics should
not be used to determine liability in a loss-of-chance action, then neither
should statistics be used to free a physician from liability under traditional
tort actions.
In Fennell v. Southern Maryland Hospital Center, Inc., the Maryland
Court of Appeals concluded by stating that the "benefits of allowing loss-of-
chance damages" are not offset by the "probable increase in medical mal-
practice litigation and medical insurance costs." ' This Note, however,
demonstrates that recognition of loss-of-chance damages and the propor-
tional valuation process in all medical malpractice cases would lead to lower
costs to the medical profession. 132 Negligence by any individual or group
that results in harm should result in liability, regardless of the potential costs
to that party in the future. Taken to its logical extreme, the Fennell court's
policy would exempt an automobile driver from liability for an accident he
negligently caused because it might raise insurance rates for all of the per-
sons insured by that company. The court's role is not to weigh the injury
caused by a party's negligence against the additional costs that the party
may have to bear in the future. Negligence that results in harm imposes
liability on the negligent party. The Fennell court has espoused a policy of
destructive judicial activism.
V. CONCLUSION
The loss-of-chance action in medical malpractice cases does not lower the
standard of proof that a plaintiff must meet. It merely recognizes that the
patient with a preexisting chance of survival of lower than fifty percent suf-
speculation. Likewise, in the loss-of-chance case, the trier must determine what the patient's
chances of survival were prior to treatment in order to determine damages. Thus, both types
of cases require the trier of fact to determine the statistical probabilities.
129. Fennell, 580 A.2d at 214.
130. Michael J. Fox, The Loss of Chance Doctrine in Medical Malpractice, 33 A.F. L.
REV. 97, 102 (1990).
131. Fennell v. Southern Md. Hosp. Ctr., Inc., 580 A.2d 206, 215 (Md. 1990).
132. See supra notes 123-24 and accompanying text.
1993]
562 Journal of Contemporary Health Law and Policy [Vol. 9:545
fers a compensable injury when she dies subsequent to negligent treatment
by her physician despite the preexisting condition. This distinct tort com-
ports with traditional requirements of proof and causation. Any uncertainty
associated with the extent of the negligently caused injury should be re-
flected in the assessment of damages. Therefore, a doctor should not be held
liable for the loss of the patient's life when it can be proven only that the
physician merely lowered the chance for survival. Likewise, in cases in
which a patient has a greater-than-fifty percent chance of survival, the medi-
cal professional should only be held liable for the proportion of chance for
which he or she was responsible for decreasing.
The recognition of loss-of-chance tort actions and the use of proportional
damages in all medical malpractice cases involving preexisting conditions
advance the position that medical professionals should be held responsible,
albeit solely for the results of their actions. When these physicians act negli-
gently, freedom from liability would only send a signal that the lives of ter-
minal patients are less valuable. Finally, as demonstrated, this process of
valuation will cause no additional liability in the aggregate. In fact, this
process may save the medical profession.' 33 And so, in the interests of con-
sistency and fairness in the law, and favorable public policy, loss-of-chance
damages should be accepted under the reasoning set for by the Falcon court
and Professor King.
Kevin Joseph Willging
133. See supra note 124 and accompanying text.
